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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, i 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, J 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake : 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
; Case No. 
BRIEF OF 
: Priority 
92-0259 
APPELLANT 
# 16 
PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and 
through counsel, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submits the following BRIEF OF APPELLANT in 
support his appeal in the above matter. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this court is based upon Ut. Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (3)(j) (1953 as amended). 
This appeal is from an order of April 5, 1991 
dismissing this action as against the defendant The Hon. 
Michael Murphy, (T.R. p. 345; EXHIBIT "BB" attached) and 
from an order of April 28, 1992 dismissing this action as 
1 
against defendant Shirley RandazzOc T.R. p. 410; EXHIBIT 
"CC" attached. 
Notice of appeal was timely filed on May 6, 1992. T.R. 
p. 413; EXHIBIT "DD" attached. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Hon. Michael Murphy, defendant/appellee imposed 
sanctions against the plaintiff/appellant, holding plaintiff 
in contempt of court for plaintiffgs alleged failure to 
properly represent a client, Frank Randazzo. Defendant 
Murphy did so in a divorce action before him, based upon 
unsworn comments made by Frank Randazzo, without giving 
plaintiff notice nor a pre-deprivation hearing. Defendant 
Murphy did so after plaintiff had withdrawn as counsel for 
Frank Randazzo. 
The sanctions imposed were that plaintiff was to 
forfeit certain attorney fees owed by Frank Randazzo to 
plaintiff. Those funds were to be paid to Shirley Eiandazzo, 
the former spouse of Frank Randazzo, for the use and benefit 
of her counsel, Ann Wassermann. The order of sanctions 
against plaintiff implicated his good name and reputation. 
Plaintiff sued seeking declaratory and other relief as 
a collateral attack against the decision of defendant 
Murphy, on the basis, inter alia, that Judge Murphy lacked 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions against plaintiff. 
2 
The trial court herein, the Hon. Pat Brian dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint as against both defendants for failure 
to state a cause of action, res judicata, judicial immunity 
and waiver. The third named defendant Ann L. Wassermann, 
was not a party to the proceedings below, although she 
appears as counsel for the defendant Randazzo. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did defendant Judge Michael Murphy have subject 
matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions and hold Barnard in 
contempt of court in Randazzo v. Randazzo? 
2. Did defendant Judge Murphy have personal 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions and hold plaintiff in 
contempt of court in Randazzo v. Randazzo? 
3. Did the imposition of sanctions in Randazzo v. 
Randazzo by defendant Judge Murphy deny Barnard due process 
of law? 
4. Were there any facts (much less sufficient "clear 
and convincing" evidence) presented to defendant Judge 
Murphy to warrant a finding of contempt and/or the 
imposition of sanctions against Barnard? 
5. Did defendant Judge Murphy comply with the 
necessary statutory provisions and did he find appropriate 
facts to hold plaintiff in contempt and to impose sanctions? 
3 
6. Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of 
judicial immunity? 
7. Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of 
waiver, or by some act of plaintiff in waiver? 
8. Is plaintiff's action barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review by this Court is a full review 
as a matter of law because all of the rulings of the court 
below were pure matters of law. 
The complaint as against Judge Murphy was dismissed on 
three (3) legal theories — res judicata, waiver and 
judicial immunity. Through findings, the trial court 
provided some explanation as to the basis of this ruling. 
Exhibit "BB" attached. 
The complaint as against Shirley Randazzo was dismissed 
for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court 
gives no indication (no findings were made) as to th€» nature 
of the complaint's defects. Exhibit "CC" attached. 
When reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6), 
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. this court assumes all facts well plead in the 
complaint are true and indulges all inferences in favor of 
the party opposing the motion. (In addition, plaintiff 
submitted an Affidavit verifying all of the facts set out in 
4 
his complaint. Aff. of Plaintiff, dated November 6, 1990, 
T.R. p. 169). 
DISPOSITIVE PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, 14th amendment. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
§ 78-7-5 
§ 78-7-17 
§ 78-7-18 
§ 78-7-24 
§§ 78-32-1 et seq 
RELATED PROCEEDING BEFORE THIS COURT 
Plaintiff herein filed a Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ against the trial court judge assigned to this case, 
the Hon. Pat Brian with this Court. Barnard v. Brian. Utah 
Supreme Court Case No. 91-0040. That action was filed for 
an immediate review by this Court of an order entered by 
Judge Brian referring this case to the Hon. Michael Murphy, 
to determine whether Judge Murphy had the jurisdiction to 
impose upon Barnard the sanctions challenged herein. 
Because such a referral would defeat the collateral review 
sought herein and because such a referral for a decision by 
a party defendant would be a denial of due process, 
extraordinary relief was granted by this court, ordering the 
Hon. Pat Brian to hear this matter and nullifying the order 
of referral. 
5 
RELATED PROCEEDING BEFORE ANOTHER COURT 
Plaintiff filed a similar action with similar 
allegations against the same defendants in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 89-C-1042-
B# Barnard vs. Murphy, et al. That action was dismissed for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Hon. Clarence 
Brimmer, by an order of May 4, 1990. A copy of that Order 
of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit "EEfl. Judge 
Brimmer made no ruling on the merits of the case. Id. 
Shortly after that federal action was dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff filed this action on May 31, 
1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This civil action seeks declaratory and injunctive 
relief to redress a deprivation of property and liberty in 
violation of the constitution and laws of the United States. 
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that an order of the 
Third Judicial District Court entered without jurisdiction 
by the Hon. Michael Murphy for the benefit of the other 
defendants is invalid, null and void. Plaintiff seeks 
attorney fees and court costs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1988. 
(Complt. 5 1; T.R. p. 2; Exhibit "AA" attached) (The 
complaint was verified by plaintiff's affidavit dated 
November 6, 1990; T.R. p. 169.) 
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2. Jurisdiction below was based on Ut. Code Ann. § 78-
3-4 (1953 as amended). (Complt. 5 2; Murphy Ans. 5 2, T.R. 
P- 30) 
3. All of the conduct complained of occurred in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (Complt. 5 3; Murphy Ans. 5 3; Randazzo 
Ans. 5 3, T.R. p. 38) 
4. Plaintiff is an attorney admitted to practice 
before the Courts of the State of Utah. (Complt. 5 4; 
Murphy Ans* 5 4, Randazzo Ans. 5 4; Plaintiffs Aff. 5 1. 
ToR. p. 169) 
5. Ann Wassermann is an attorney admitted to practice 
before the Courts of the State of Utah. (Complt. 5 5; 
Murphy Ans. 5 5; Randazzo Ans. 5 5) 
6. Shirley Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident 
of Salt Lake County, Utah. (Complt. 5 6; Murphy Ans. 5 6; 
Randazzo Ans. 5 6) 
7. Frank Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident of 
Salt Lake County, Utah. He is not a defendant in this 
action. (Complt. 5 7; Murphy Ans. 5 7) 
8. Defendant Michael Murphy is a judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. (Complt. 5 8; Murphy Ans. 5; Randazzo Ans. 5 8) 
9. Plaintiff formerly represented Mr. Randazzo in a 
divorce in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah (Case No. 88-490-4130 DA) 
7 
captioned Shirley Randazzo vs. Frank Randazzo. (Complt. 5 
9; Murphy Ans. I 9; Randazzo Ans. 5 9) 
10. That divorce action was tried to the Hon* Michael 
Murphy on August 1, 1989. Ann Wassermann represented 
Shirley Randazzo in that action. (Complt. 5 10; Murphy Ans. 
5 10; Randazzo Ans. 5 10) 
11. After the trial and prior to September 13, 1989, 
plaintiff withdrew as counsel for Mr. Randazzo and gave 
notice of that withdrawal to the Third District Court, to 
Mr. Randazzo and to Ann Wassermann. (Complt. f 11; Murphy 
Ans. 5 11, Randazzo Ans. I 11; Plaintiff's Aff. f 4) 
12. After the trial and before Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce were entered, Mr. 
Randazzo allegedly failed to comply with the terms of the 
court's ruling. 
13. At the request of Shirley Randazzo and counsel, 
the trial court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Mr. 
Randazzo to appear before Judge Murphy on September 13, 1989 
to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court 
for failure to comply with the Court's rulings. 
14. On September 13, 1989 a hearing was held in said 
divorce action before Judge Murphy. Plaintiff was not 
present; present were defendants Murphy and Randazzo along 
with Ann Wassermann and Mr. Randazzo. The hearing was to 
consider alleged contempt by Mr. Randazzo for failure to 
8 
comply with the court's rulings. (Complt. f 12; Murphy Ans. 
5 12; Randazzo Ans. 5 12) 
15. At said hearing, Mr. Randazzo made certain 
representations to the Court regarding plaintiff's 
representation of Mr. Randazzo. Those representations were 
NOT under oath. Those representations were false, 
incomplete and/or misleading. Mr. Randazzo, made represent-
ations to Judge Murphy as to what plaintiff, his former 
counsel, did or did not do in representing Mr. Randazzo. 
(Complt. 5 13; Aff. of Plaintiff; Exhibit # 1 to Murphy's 
Summary Judgment Memorandum, Transcript of September 13, 
1989 hearing — T.R. p. 46; Randazzo Ans. 5 13) 
16. A copy of the transcript of the hearing of 
September 13, 1989 in Randazzo is an Exhibit in this action. 
Exhibit # 1 to Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum — T.R. 
p. 46. 
17. At the hearing of September 13, 1989, the 
defendant Murphy, sua sponte made an oral ruling that the 
plaintiff had acted improperly in his representation of Mr. 
Randazzo. Based upon the unsworn comments of Mr. Randazzo, 
Judge Murphy imposed sanctions against plaintiff and found 
plaintiff in contempt of court for his alleged failure to 
properly represent Mr. Randazzo and for his alleged failure 
to notify Mr. Randazzo as to the Court's prior rulings. 
Judge Murphy fined plaintiff by depriving him of a debt owed 
9 
by Mr. Randazzo. The defendant Murphy ruled that Mr. 
Randazzo should not pay to plaintiff the sum of $430.00 
(Four Hundred Thirty Dollars) a portion of fees incurred in 
plaintiff's representation of Mr. Randazzo. Xnstecid, Mr. 
Randazzo was ordered to pay that amount to Shirley Randazzo 
and Ann Wassermann as and for attorney fees and costs 
incurred by Shirley Randazzo. (Complt. I 14; Murphy Ans. 5 
14; Transcript of September 13, 1989 hearing, Exhibit #1 to 
Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "O" to 
Complaint Exhibit "AA" attached; Plaintiff's Aff. 5 5; 
Randazzo Ans. 5 14) 
18. Plaintiff was not given notice that the hearing of 
September 13, 1989 would consider any alleged mis-conduct of 
plaintiff. Plaintiff was not given notice that said hearing 
would consider imposition of any sanction against plaintiff. 
(Complt. 5 15; Plaintiff's Aff. 1 6) 
19. Plaintiff was not requested to be present at said 
hearing and was not given an opportunity to be heard at said 
hearing. Plaintiff was never requested to respond to Mr. 
Randazzo's allegations against him. (Complt. 5 16; 
Plaintiff's Aff. 5 6) 
20. After said hearing, Ann Wassermann prepared a 
proposed order embodying the oral decision of the Court. A 
copy of that proposed order is attached to plaintiff's 
Complaint (Exhibit "AA" attached) as Exhibit "0". Ann 
10 
Wassermann mailed a copy of the proposed order to plaintiff 
on September 15, 1989. (Complt. 5 17; Randazzo Ans. 5 17; 
Murphy Ans. 5 17) 
21• Said oral ruling and the proposed order deprive 
plaintiff of property. (Complt. fl 18; Randazzo Ans. 5 18; 
Transcript of September 13, 1989 Hearing, Exhibit # 1 to 
Murphy/s Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "0" to 
Complaint) 
22. Said oral ruling and the proposed order harm the 
plaintiff's good name and reputation in the findings therein 
to the effect that plaintiff acted improperly in his 
representation of Mr. Randazzo. (Complt. 5 19; Murphy Ans. 
I 6; Transcript of September 13, 1989 Hearing, Exhibit # 1 
to Murphy's Summary Judgment Memorandum; Order, Exhibit "0" 
to Complaint) 
23. In response to receipt of said proposed Order 
plaintiff filed an Objection on or about September 18, 1989. 
Attached to plaintiff's Complaint (Exhibit "AA") as Exhibit 
"B". (Complt. 5 20; Murphy Ans. 5 20; Randazzo Ans. f 20; 
Plaintiff's Aff. J 7) 
24. In response to receipt of said proposed order, 
plaintiff filed an Affidavit on or about September 18, 1989. 
Attached to plaintiff's Complaint (Exhibit "AA") as Exhibit 
"A". (Complt. ? 21; Murphy Ans. 5 21; Randazzo Ans. 5 21; 
Plaintiff's Aff. f 7) 
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25. On September 20, 1989, plaintiff requested a 
hearing before defendant Murphy to consider plaintiffs 
Objection. Exhibit "R" attached to plaintiff's Complaint 
(Exhibit "AA"). (Murphy Ans. 5 22; Plaintiff's Aff. 5 7). 
No hearing was ever held in response to that request. 
(Murphy Ans. 5 22; Complt. I 22) 
26. On October 4, 1989 plaintiff inquired of defendant 
Murphy as to the status of the proposed order and the 
plaintiff's Objection thereto. Letter of October 4, 1989 
attached hereto as Exhibit "FF". Plaintiff received no 
response to that letter. 
27. Without any further notice to plaintiff, Judge 
Murphy signed the written order of sanctions against 
plaintiff on October 12, 1989. (Plaintiff's Aff. 5 8) 
28. Plaintiff never consented to jurisdiction over 
plaintiff of Judge Murphy or the Third District Court to 
enter the order of sanctions. Plaintiff never waived the 
lack of jurisdiction of the Third District Court and Judge 
Murphy over plaintiff to enter an order of sanctions. 
Plaintiff protested that Judge Murphy was denying plaintiff 
due process of law and lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff to 
enter an order affecting plaintiff's rights and imposing 
sanctions without notice, etc. (Plaintiff's Aff. f 9) 
12 
29. Plaintiff never withdrew his objection and 
affidavit in opposition (September 18, 1989) to the proposed 
order of sanctions. (Plaintiff's Aff. 1 10) 
30. Before October 12, 1989, plaintiff was not 
afforded or offered any hearing on his objection to the 
proposed order of sanctions. (Plaintiff's Aff. 5 11) 
31. After October 12, 1989, plaintiff was informed by 
Judge Murphy's clerk that the order of sanctions had been 
signed and that plaintiff could request that Judge Murphy 
set aside the order of sanctions. The clerk said that 
plaintiff could have a hearing to argue that Judge Murphy 
should set aside the order. The clerk told plaintiff in the 
alternative, that if Ms. Wassermann agreed, an amended order 
could be signed. (Plaintiff's Aff. 5 12) 
32. No explanation has been offered why Judge Murphy 
on October 12, 1989 over plaintiff's objection and without 
any hearing, signed the order of sanctions. (Plaintiff's 
Aff. 5 13) 
33. Since Judge Murphy on October 12, 1989 had signed 
the order of sanctions, on November 14, 1989, plaintiff 
informed Judge Murphy's clerk that oral argument to set 
aside the signed order was not necessary (plaintiff never 
made such a motion). (Plaintiff's Aff. 5 14) 
34. Plaintiff had requested a hearing on plaintiff's 
objection before the order of sanctions was signed. 
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Plaintiff did not make a motion to set aside the order of 
sanctions after it was signed. (Plaintiff's Affe f 15) 
35. Without further hearing, defendant Murphy on 
November 14, 1989 entered the Order of sanctions. (Complt. 5 
23; Plaintiffs Aff. f 8; Murphy Ans. J 23) 
36. The order of sanctions is a matter of public 
record. (Complt. 5 23) 
37. When defendant Murphy signed that order on October 
12, 1989 he was aware that plaintiff had filed an objection 
and Judge Murphy knew the basis of the objection. 
(Plaintiff's Aff. 5 8; Complt. 5 23; Exhibit "FF" cittached) 
38 Plaintiff had no right to a hearing on his 
objection. Under the procedures of the District Courts of 
Utah then in effect the Courts were to consider and rule on 
motions and objections without hearing. Rule 4-501, Code of 
Judicial Administration, Operations of the Courts (1988). 
Under said rules, counsel could only request a hearing; only 
the court, in its discretion, could authorize such hearings 
and only on dispositive motions. Id. 
39. Because this action affects the rights of Shirley 
Randazzo she is an indispensable party. (Complt. f 27) 
40. Plaintiff is not a party to the underlying divorce 
action between Shirley Randazzo and Mr. Randazzo. He is no 
longer attorney for Mr. Randazzo and was not counsel of 
record when the offending Order was entered. (Complt. 5 29) 
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41. The actions of defendant Murphy were taken under 
color of state law and under the power granted to him as a 
Judge of the District Court of the State of Utah. (Complt. 
5 30) 
42. Plaintiff seeks no damages in this action. 
(Complt.) 
43. Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees and costs in 
the pursuit of this matter and seeks to recover such fees 
and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Complt. f 40) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND 
JUDGE MURPHY HAD NO 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UPON PLAINTIFF 
The powers of a Utah district court are established by 
statute. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24 
(1953 as amended). Those powers do not include the power to 
punish an attorney for a ethical violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, as determined by 
Judge Murphy, that the plaintiff herein: 
(a) Did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of the 
details of the court's decision as announced in Mr. 
Randazzo's absence on August 2, 1989; and, 
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(b) Did not forward to Mr* Randazzo copies of the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce; 
those errors are ethical violations. Failure to provide 
notice or forward proposed pleadings as alleged must be 
dealt with by a proceeding before the ethics committee of 
the Utah State Bar.1 Utah Constitution Art. VIII, § 4; 
Rules for Integration & Management of the Utah State Bar, § 
(c) 12. 
District court judges have the power to enforce his/her 
own orders, maintain decorum in the court room, etc. (Ut. 
Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24 (1953 as 
amended)), but a judge does not have the power to enforce 
ethical rules of the Utah State Bar. Such enforcement is 
preempted by the State Bar and the Utah Supreme Court. Utah 
Constitution Art. VIII, § 4; Rules for Integration & 
Management of the Utah State Bar, § (c) 12. 
Because the alleged mis-conduct of the plaintiff fell 
outside the specific statutory grant of power to a district 
court, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-5, § 78-7-17 and § 78-7-24 
1 Noting the alleged mis-conduct of plaintiff herein, 
the applicable provisions of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar would be: Rule 1.3 (A lawyer 
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.), Rule 1.4 (a) (A lawyer shall keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.) 
and, Rule 1.4 (b) (A lawyer shall explain a matter to the 
extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation.) 
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(1953 as amended)), and outside the contempt powers granted 
to a district court, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-18, §§ 78-32-1 et 
seq (1953 as amended)), Judge Murphy was without subject 
matter jurisdiction to impose sanctions. 
POINT II 
THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND 
JUDGE MURPHY HAD NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS UPON PLAINTIFF 
The district court and defendant Murphy lacked personal 
jurisdiction to impose sanctions upon plaintiff. Plaintiff 
was not "before the Court" when on September 13, 1989, 
defendant Murphy ruled and imposed sanctions. 
Judge Murphy has never set forth the basis for 
jurisdiction over plaintiff and plaintiff's alleged mis-
conduct such that Murphy could impose sanctions and rule 
that plaintiff failed to properly represent his former 
client.2 Judges do not have the power to willy-nilly punish 
people that have not properly represented clients. There is 
no inherent power of a judge to make counsel act in a 
certain way outside the courtroom; the power of a court to 
control an attorney is based upon statutory provisions. For 
a court to punish an attorney for a failure to act there 
2
 Interestingly, defendants in this action refused to 
respond to discovery inquiring as to the basis of 
jurisdiction for Judge Murphy's actions. 
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must be a specific grant of power. Punishment may be 
imposed only when power and jurisdiction are granted, and 
personal jurisdiction invoked and the party properly brought 
before the court. 
The only possible claim of subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction by defendant Murphy over the plaintiff is that 
of contempt of court. Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-32-1 et seq (1953 
as amended). Otherwise, defendant Murphy has no power to 
regulate plaintiff's conduct. A district court judcje has no 
power to punish counsel for an alleged breach of the* canons 
of ethics. See supra. A district court judge is granted 
power to punish persons for contempt of court only for 
specific reasons and in the specific manner provided by law. 
Ut. Code Ann. § 78-7-18; §§ 78-32-1 et seq (1953 as 
amended). 
Only if contempt is committed in the immediate presence 
of the judge may the (direct) contempt be punished 
summarily. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1953 as amended). The 
alleged mis-conduct of plaintiff occurred outside the 
presence of defendant Murphy. If the contempt (indirect) is 
not committed in the immediate presence of the judge, "an 
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the 
facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of facts. 
o" Id. Based thereupon an order to show cause may issue, 
which, when served brings the accused under the personal 
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jurisdiction of the Court, Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-4 (1953 as 
amended)• 
Absent the required initiatory affidavit or statement 
of facts, (Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1953 as amended)) a 
court lacks the jurisdiction to punish for contempt not 
committed in its presence. Bott v. Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 
437 P.2d 684 (Ut. 1968); Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City 
of Qqden, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947); Crowther v. 
District Court. 93 Utah 586, 54 P.2d 243 (Ut. 1936). 
These statutory procedures and required service give 
the accused written notice of the allegations. The accused 
also has the right to answer the charges against him, to 
examine witnesses against him, to present evidence, and to 
be represented by counsel. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-9 (1953 as 
amended); Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Qqden. 112 
Ut. 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 
1320 (Ut. 1982). 
In Robinson v. City Court ex rel. City of Qqden, 112 
Ut. 36, 185 P.2d 256 (Ut. 1947) this Court held in an 
indirect contempt proceeding the accused is entitled: 
a) to know the nature and cause of accusation against 
him, 
b) to receive a copy thereof, 
c) to be permitted to plead or respond, 
d) to be represented by counsel, and 
e) to be afforded the right to be heard. 
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In Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Ut. 1982) this 
Court again articulated the due process requirements in an 
indirect contempt proceeding/ adding to the list from 
Robinson: 
Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not committed in 
the presence of the court, due process requires that 
the person charged be advised of the nature of the 
action against him, have assistance of counsel, if 
requested, have the right to confront the witnesses, 
and have the right to offer testimony on his behalf. 
Id. at 1322; State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1228 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988) . 
Plaintiff herein was never given an opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine Mr. Randazzo under oath, as to 
his allegations against plaintiff. Plaintiff was never 
afforded the right to present testimony on his own behalf. 
In State v. Halverson. 754 P.2d 1228 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1988) , the attorney of record failed to appear for a 
scheduled criminal trial and was summarily found in contempt 
in his absence and without any hearing. After the finding 
was entered, the attorney requested a hearing and an 
opportunity to present evidence; the trial court declined on 
the basis that no evidence was necessary because the 
contempt was direct, that is committed in the presence of 
the court. The Utah Court of Appeals determined that the 
actions would be indirect contempt and this, due process 
required written notice, the right to confront witnesses, 
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the presentation of evidence, etc. The refusal of the 
Halverson trial court to receive evidence even during the 
post-deprivation hearing was fatal to the finding of 
contempt, and the Court of Appeals vacated the finding of 
contempt. 
Due process of law requires that before a judgment of 
indirect contempt may be made, there must be an evidentiary 
hearing. Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-9 (1953 as amended) (the 
court "must hear any answer which the person arrested may 
make to the [charge of contempt], and may examine witnesses 
for or against him. . . " ) ; Ut. Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (1953 as 
amended) ("[u]pon the answer and evidence taken" the guilt 
of the accused is determined.); State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 
1228 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988); Herald-Republican Pub. Co. v. 
Lewis. 42 Utah 188, 129 P. 624 (1912). No evidentiary 
hearing was held before Judge Murphy regarding the alleged 
contemptuous acts of Barnard. 
The accused has the right to be heard on the merits 
prior to the entry of a judgement of contempt. Herald-
Republican Pub. Co. v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 P. 624 
(1912) . Plaintiff was given no opportunity to be heard on 
the merits prior to the entry of the order. 
A judgement of contempt requires clear and convincing 
evidence. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1988); 
Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v. 
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Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977). There was no such 
evidence or proof in this case. As discussed infra, there 
is no admissible evidence, much less clear and convincing 
proof, of any mis-conduct by plaintiff. 
Written finding of fact and conclusions of law are 
required before a judgment of contempt may be entered. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut« 1988); Thomas v. Thomas, 
569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977). Failure to make written finding 
and conclusions make the judgement of contempt unenforceable 
and requires vacating the judgement. Salzetti v. Backman, 
638 P.2d 543 (Ut. 1981); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 118, 378 
P.2d 519 (Ut. 1963). There were inadequate or no findings 
in the underlying case. (Exhibit "0" part of Exhibit "AA" 
attached.) The absence of findings and conclusions voids 
Judge Murphy's determination. 
Four (4) elements are necessary for a finding of 
contempt of court; they are: 
the party knew what was required, 
and having the ability to comply, 
intentionally, willfully and knowingly 
failed and refused to comply. 
Ut. Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Labrum, 762 P.2d 1070 (Ut. 
1988); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1988); Coleman 
v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v. Thomas, 569 
P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977). To support a judgement of contempt, 
Judge Murphy was required to make factual finding and legal 
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conclusions establishing each of these four (4) elements. 
He made no such findings or legal conclusions. The closest 
statements to findings is defendant Murphy's recitation in 
the Order that: 
a) Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely 
notice of the details of the Court's decision as 
announced in Mr. Randazzo's absence on August 2, 1989, 
and 
b) Barnard did not forward to Mr. Randazzo copies 
of the proposed Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce. 
The lack of adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law 
by Judge Murphy, the failure to follow proper procedures and 
the failure to prove the four (4) required elements nullify 
the judge's order. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO FACTUAL 
BASIS FOR JUDGE MURPHY'S 
ORDER OF SANCTIONS 
Assuming arguendo that the defendant Murphy had subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the 
plaintiff and his actions, there is no factual basis for 
finding that plaintiff failed to properly represent his 
client. No facts show plaintiff to be in contempt of court. 
At the September 13, 1989 hearing Mr. Randazzo was 
never place under oath; thus, his representation about not 
23 
receiving notice, not being orally informed of the court's 
trial decision and not receiving copies of the Findings and 
Divorce Decree are only, representations, or as steited in 
the Order, just "comments." 
Countering those comments is the uncontrovertetd 
Affidavit of Brian M. Barnard of September 18, 1989 setting 
forth in detail under oath his actions in conveying notice 
to Mr. Randazzo regarding the hearing, the decision and the 
Findings. That Affidavit established that plaintiff fully 
informed Mr. Randazzo in a timely fashion of the court's 
ruling and timely forwarded the proposed Findings and 
Divorce Decree. Exhibit "A" part of Exhibit "AA" attached. 
To find plaintiff in contempt, the court must have 
clear and convincing evidence of willful misconduct* 
Coleman v. Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155 (Ut. 1983); Thomas v. 
Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 (Ut. 1977). The evidence presented to 
Judge Murphy does not even rise to the lesser standard of a 
preponderance of the evidence. There is no admissible 
evidence to show that plaintiff failed in his duty to 
represent Mr. Randazzo; in fact, the only valid evidence 
presented establishes that plaintiff acted properly. 
There are no facts to support the determination by 
defendant Murphy that plaintiff acted improperly in 
representing his former client. Defendant Murphy failed to 
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make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the 
imposition of sanctions against plaintiff, 
POINT IV 
THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Defendants offered five (5) affirmative defenses in 
Answers to plaintiff's complaint. They were (1) failure to 
state a claim; (2) judicial immunity; (3) claim preclusion; 
(4) issue preclusion; and, (5) waiver. Plaintiff addresses 
each affirmative defense below. 
A. Plaintiff/s Complaint States A Claim Pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1983. 
The complaint states a cause of action as a collateral 
attack on a defective order. Where lack of jurisdictional 
renders a judgment void, that judgment is properly subject 
to collateral attack. See, e.g., Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 
602 (Ut. 1952); Ut. R Civ. Pro. 60(b) ("The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action 
[emphasis added.]"). Judge Murphy's Order was entered 
without jurisdiction. Therefore, this collateral attack is 
an appropriate method to challenge defendant Murphy7s 
invalid Order. 
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There are no substantive defects in plaintiff's cause 
of action. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
can be granted only if (1) plaintiff's complaint does not 
give defendant fair notice of the nature and basis of the 
claims against him# and (2) the allegations contained in the 
complaint, if provedf would not establish that plaintiff is 
entitled to relief. E.g., Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465 (Ut. 
1982); Blackham v. Snelcrrove, 318 P.2d 642 (Ut. 1955). When 
evaluating whether plaintiff's complaint states a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, the court must liberally 
construe plaintiff's claim for relief. Gill v. Timm, 720 
P.2d 1352 (Ut. 1986). 
Plaintiff's claims are advanced in part pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint expressly notifies 
defendants that plaintiff's claims are based on 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (Complaint, at If 1, 2, 31, 40). An action pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies where defendants have improperly 
deprived plaintiff of a liberty or property right under 
color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 
(1980). Therefore, plaintiff states a claim if the facts he 
avers establish (1) a constitutional violation, and (2) 
state action. 
The complaint, assuming all facts as plead can be 
proven, states a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C § 
1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (plaintiff 
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states § 1983 claim where defendant acts under color of 
state law to deprive plaintiff of a federally guaranteed 
right). There is no question that Judge Murphy has the 
power and the right, within appropriate due process 
constraints, to sanction an attorney guilty of mis-conduct 
before his court. The basis of this suit is that Judge 
Murphy had no subject matter and no personal jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff when he orally imposed sanctions or when 
he reduced those sanctions to writing. This action seeks 
declaratory relief that the procedures employed by defendant 
Murphy deprived plaintiff of property and liberty without 
due process. This action does not seek an appellate review 
of the merits of a decision of the Third District Court. 
Plaintiff is challenging the process (or lack thereof) 
by which the decision was rendered. Plaintiff's action is 
an appropriate means to mount such a challenge: 
A § 1983 action may be brought for a violation of 
procedural due process . . . . In procedural due 
process claims, the deprivation by state action of 
a constitutionally protected interest in "life, 
liberty, of property" is not in itself 
unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the 
deprivation of such an interest without due 
process of law. 
Zinermon v. Burch, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 975, 983 (1990) 
(emphasis in original) (cites omitted). 
A due process violation does not occur simply because a 
deprivation occurs. It is complete upon the state's failure 
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to provide constitutionally adequate procedural due process. 
See Id.. at 983-984. 
This is a collateral attack on a void judgment entered 
without jurisdiction as authorized by Rule 60(b)(5), 
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. Plaintiff has the right to commence this 
independent action for relief from that judgment and order. 
Plaintiff is only tangentially contesting the merits of 
Judge Murphy's order. Plaintiff concedes that with proper 
notice and opportunity to be heard, sanctions might still be 
imposed.3 
Contrary to defendants7 assertion a court can review 
plaintiff's claimed denial of due process without "reviewing 
the record of the Third District Court proceedings and the 
propriety of Judge Murphy's order based upon that record." 
The facts of this case are not "inextricably intertwined" 
with the facts of the underlying divorce action, Randazzo v. 
Randazzo. This case can be resolved without any 
consideration of the facts of that divorce action and with 
out any consideration of the facts alleged to justify the 
imposition of sanctions upon the plaintiff. Plaintiff's 
attempt to invalidate the order of sanctions is based upon 
3
 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (the fact 
that the same result might have occurred even with adequate 
due process protection is not a defense to a claim of denial 
of procedural due process). 
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procedural considerations and is unrelated to whether 
sanctions should ultimately be imposed upon the plaintiff*4 
1. Judge Murphy deprived plaintiff of protected 
interests without due process. 
Judge Murphy's Order deprived plaintiff of protected 
property and liberty interests without pre-deprivation due 
process. An improper deprivation of property occurs where a 
court orders a debtor not to pay a creditor without 
providing the creditor appropriate due process protection. 
Cf., North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem Inc., 419 U.S. 
601 (1975) (statute allowing garnishment of property without 
adequate pre-deprivation due process violated the 14th 
Amendment due process guarantees). Likewise, a deprivation 
of liberty occurs where a plaintiff's integrity is harmed in 
conjunction with a deprivation of property, without 
appropriate due process protection. Zinermon v. Burch, 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct 975 (1990) (especially where the state is 
in a position to provide a pre-deprivation hearing, "[a] § 
1983 action may be brought for a violation of procedural due 
process . . . .fl Id., at 983). 
Here, plaintiff provided legal services for which his 
former client owed plaintiff over Four Hundred Dollars 
4
 The thrust of this case is how does a trial court 
judge impose sanctions for improper conduct against an 
attorney, no longer counsel of record for a party. The 
appropriate method is set out in the statutes and case law 
as to indirect contempt as discussed supra. 
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($400.00+) in fees. Without notice or hearing, Judge Murphy 
deprived plaintiff of his vested property interest in the 
former client's payment of those fees. 
Defendant Shirley Randazzo is an indispensable party. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(a)(2). If this 
action is successful, the rights of Ms. Randazzo will be 
affected. Her entitlement to payment from plaintiff's 
former client before the former client pays plaintiff's 
attorney fees will be nullified. Therefore, she is an 
indispensable party.5 Limits on plaintiff's ability to file 
a claim for the full indebtedness owed by Mr. Randazzo in 
Mr. Randazzo's bankruptcy proceeding is a property interest. 
If the facts in the complaint are proved, plaintiff has 
demonstrated that he was deprived of a property interest 
without adequate due process in violation of the 14th 
amendment. 
Where injury to plaintiff's reputation occurs in 
conjunction with a property deprivation, the injury is 
actionable under the 14th amendment. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1977) (actionable deprivation of liberty where 
5
 Just as plaintiff herein complains that Judge Murphy 
deprived him of property without due process on September 
13, 1989, Ms. Randazzo would have a similar complaint of 
deprivation without due process if she were not a party to 
this action which seeks to reverse a decision that granted 
her and/or her counsel money taken from plaintiff's accounts 
receivable. 
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damage to reputation is coupled with diminished future 
education and employment opportunities). At the hearing in 
which Judge Murphy deprived plaintiff of the property 
interest the Judge also impugned plaintiff's professional 
reputation. The judge pursuant to the unsworn testimony, 
found that plaintiff had failed to notify his former client 
of rulings and hearings. The Order damaged plaintiff's 
professional reputation to the extent that he might be 
deprived of future employment and professional 
opportunities. If the facts in the complaint are proved, 
defendant will be liable for depriving plaintiff of a 
protected liberty interest without adequate due process in 
violation of the 14th Amendment. 
2. Plaintiff is not seeking a review or an appeal of the 
merits of Judge Murphy's decision. 
There is no question that Judge Murphy has the power 
and the right, with appropriate due process protections, to 
impose sanctions against an attorney guilty of contemptuous 
mis-conduct. Plaintiff does not challenge the right of 
Judge Murphy to impose sanctions when imposed with due 
process. 
To the contrary, plaintiff seeks a determination of the 
invalidity of Judge Murphy's order on the grounds that it 
was improperly entered, that is, without jurisdiction, 
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without due process and without proper procedures — the 
challenge is one of procedure and not one of the mejrits. As 
the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Zinermon, supra % 
In procedural due process claims, the deprivation 
by state action of a constitutionally protected 
interest in "life, liberty, or property" is not in 
itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional 
is the deprivation of such an interest without due 
process of law. 
Id., at 983 (emphasis in original), citing Parratt 451 U.S. 
at 537; Carev v. Piohus. 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). 
The court declared further, "a deprivation of procedural due 
process is actionable under § 1983 without regard to whether 
the same deprivation would have taken place even in the 
presence of proper procedural safeguards." Zinermon, at 983 
n.ll, citing Carey, ar 266. 
B• Judge Murphy Is Not Entitled To Judicial Immunity. 
This action does not seek damages against Judge Murphy 
but only declaratory and injunctive relief. In Pulliam v. 
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), the Court held that judicial 
immunity does not extend to claims for prospective relief 
against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity, 
or to a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 claim for attorney's fees. 
Therefore, Judge Murphy is not entitled to judicial 
immunity. As long as the order remains enforceable, 
plaintiff suffers an ongoing deprivation of protected 
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property and liberty interests. The Order prevents 
plaintiff from recovering his property and harms his liberty 
interests. Here, just as in Pulliam, supra. plaintiff seeks 
perspective relief from an ongoing unconstitutional 
practice. 
The statements regarding judicial immunity contained in 
Navaio Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 
130 (D. Utah 1985) cited by defendant Murphy, cannot be 
applied to this matter for at least two indisputable 
reasons. In Navaio Nation, the Tribe sought to effectively 
overturn another court's finding that state adoption 
procedures did not violate the Tribe's statutory and 
constitutional rights. Id., at 135. 
The first reason that Navaio Nation cannot be applied 
here is that in that case the court expressly determined 
that the Tribe was merely seeking appellate review of the 
adoption court's decision. Id., at 137. Here, plaintiff 
does not challenge the merits of Judge Murphy's Order. 
Plaintiff seeks relief from that judgment because it was 
rendered absent subject matter and personal jurisdiction, 
and in violation of plaintiff's due process rights. Hence, 
Pulliam controls here, not Navaio Nations. 
The second reason Navaio Nations cannot control here is 
that the Navaio Nations court did not hold that the Tribe's 
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claims were barred by judicial immunity. That court's 
statements regarding judicial immunity were mere dictas 
Although we need not reach the question of 
judicial immunity, this Court finds it appropriate 
to address this point as an additional basis for 
dismissal of the claims against defendant Judge 
David Sam. 
Id., at 136. The court had already determined that the 
Tribe'& claims were barred. Hence, the court's subsequent 
statements were not necessary to the final disposition of 
the matter, and the statements do not constitute any part of 
the final judgment. The statements as pure dicta cannot 
control here. 
Judicial immunity does not apply when, as in the 
underlying case, Judge Murphy was acting beyond his 
jurisdiction. Martinez v. Winner. 771 F*2d 424, 434 (10th 
Cir. 1985). As fully set out supra, Judge Murphy was 
outside his jurisdiction in imposing sanctions upon 
plaintiff. Thus, defendant Murphy is not protected by 
judicial immunity. 
Finally, Pulliam v. Allen, supra, cannot be read to 
limit judicial immunity in only those cases where the 
unconstitutional conduct to be enjoined is ongoing. The 
language of Pulliam clearly applies to any enjoinable, 
future judicial action, whether or not that action is an 
ongoing practice of the judge. Id., at 541-542 ("[J]udicial 
immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief 
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against a judicial officer acting in her judicial 
capacity"). No cases can be cited showing otherwise. 
Judge Murphy did not even begin to comply with the case 
law and statutory procedures required to punish someone for 
indirect contempt; thus, he lacked jurisdiction to impose 
sanctions. Acting without jurisdiction, Judge Murphy is not 
entitled to judicial immunity. 
If the interpretation of judicial immunity made by the 
trial court herein were correct, a judge could never be sued 
in a collateral attack or in an action seeking an extra-
ordinary writ. During the pendency of this action plaintiff 
herein sued Judge Brian the trial court judge in this case 
seeking an extraordinary writ to correct an error committed 
in Judge Brian,s handling of this case. Barnard vs. Brian, 
Ut. Sup. Court Case No. 91-0040. Obviously, Judge Brian was 
not immune from that suit in which this Court acted to 
correct his error. Kelsev v. The Hon. Timothy R. Hanson, 
818 P.2d 590, 170 Ut.Adv.Rep. 41 (Ut.App. 1991)(extra-
ordinary writ issued against judge to correct error as to 
consideration of affidavit of impecuniosity)• 
Judge Brian's interpretation of judicial immunity would 
severely limit the provision of Rule 60(b) Ut.R.Civ.Pro. 
allowing for collateral attacks or independent actions to 
challenge invalid judgments or orders. Although a 
collateral attack often will name only parties to an action 
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as defendants, designating Judge Murphy as a defendant in 
this collateral attack is appropriate, if not mandatory, 
because the order of sanctions was entered sua sponte by 
Judge Murphy. At the September 13, 1989 hearing neither 
Shirley Randazzo nor her counsel requested sanctions against 
plaintiff; without request from anyone, Judge Murphy 
summarily imposed sanctions! 
If the trial court'& interpretation of judicial 
immunity were correct, the only avenue to challenge an error 
by a judge would be an appeal. Neither defendants nor the 
trial court judge cite any authority for such a proposition. 
Judicial immunity protects a judge from a suit for 
damages. Judicial immunity does not protect a judge from an 
action in equity to correct errors, to invalidate judgments 
entered without jurisdiction or to prevent the future 
enforcement of an improperly entered order. 
C* Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Barred By Res Judicata 
The doctrine of res judicata comprises two distinct 
concepts: (1) claim preclusion, and (2) issue preclusion. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1988)* 
Prior to filing this action, plaintiff filed a similar 
action in United States District Court for the District of 
Utah. The federal case was dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. (Order of Judge C. Brimmer, dated May 
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4, 1990, Exhibit "EE" attached) This case is almost the 
same as the federal case which Judge Brimmer dismissed, 
however, neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion bar 
this case. 
1. The federal dismissal order does not preclude 
plaintiffs claim. 
A claim can be precluded by a previous action only 
where "a second claim between the same parties or their 
privies concerning the same claim or cause of action 
previously rendered final by judgment of the merits." Dept. 
of Social Services v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114, 116 (Ut. App. 
1987), citing Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387 (Ut. App. 1987); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873 (Ut. 1983); Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 
P.2d 243 (Ut. 1978). 
The ruling of federal Judge Brimmer in the prior case 
was a determination that the federal court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction. A judgment does not have claim 
preclusion effect where the prior claim was dismissed for 
want of jurisdiction. E.g., Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426 
(1883); Hvdaburg Co-op Ass'n v. United States, 667 F.2d 64 
(Ct. CI. 1981) (when an action is dismissed on jurisdic-
tional grounds, findings on the merits are a nullity); see 
also Friedenthal & Miller, Sum and Substance of Civil 
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Procedure. § 16.4341 (1985) ("A dismissal because of 
improper venue or a lack of personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction is never on the merits . . . ." (Emphasis 
added)). 
The federal ruling of Judge Brimmer expressly stated: 
[A] federal district court is without jurisdiction 
to review a state court judicial decision. The 
Order which is the source of [plaintiff's] 
complaint is just such a judicial decision, and 
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to 
hear this case. 
Exhibit "EE" attached at 6. The federal judge dismissed 
plaintifffs federal court claim for want of jurisdiction, 
thus any reference by Judge Brimmer to judicial immunity is 
dicta. While the trial court may make an independent 
determination of Judge Murphy's claim of judicial immunity, 
the federal determination does not and cannot bar 
plaintiff7s claim in this action. 
2. The previous federal ruling cannot control the trial 
court's independent determination on the issue of Judge 
Murphy's immunity. 
Judge Murphy argues that the previous federal ruling 
established that he was immune from plaintiff's claims. 
Therefore, he concludes, plaintiff is precluded from re-
litigating the issue of immunity. 
This Court has defined four (4) elements which must be 
established before an issue may be precluded by a previous 
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proceeding. E.g., Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 
(Ut. 1988) . Plaintiff addresses only the second element 
here, because Judge Murphy7s issue preclusion defense fails 
completely on that element. The second element of the issue 
preclusion test is "the judgment must be final with respect 
to that issue." 
As set forth above, the federal ruling was expressly 
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
A dismissal for want of jurisdiction is a matter of form, 
not a final determination of the parties' legal rights. 
Ruscetta, 742 P.2d at 117. See also Robertson v. Campbell, 
674 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Ut. 1983) ("What is critical is whether 
the issue that was actually litigated in the first suit was 
essential to resolution of that suit. . . . " (Emphasis 
added))• 
Where a claim is dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the merits of the claim have 
not been adjudicated. Penrod, 669 P.2d at 877. 
Ruscetta, at 116. 
Here, the federal court's dicta on judicial immunity 
was not necessary to the proceeding's final disposition. 
While the issue of judicial immunity was raised in the 
federal case, it was not "adjudicated." The issue was not a 
part of the federal court's final judgment. The federal 
court's gratuitous dicta cannot preclude the trial court's 
independent determination of judicial immunity in this case. 
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Clearly, the previous dismissal for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot preclude plaintiff's claim. Nor 
does the previous dismissal preclude independent de-
termination of judicial immunity asserted by Judge Murphy as 
a defense. There was no final adjudication on the merits, 
thus neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel apply to 
the current action. 
D. Plaintiff Did Not Waive His Right to Challenge The 
Validity of Judge Murphy's Order. 
The defendant Murphy presents no facts to establish 
that the doctrine of waiver is applicable. In fact, 
defendant Murphy failed to state in his answer what he 
claims the plaintiff "waived." Murphy's Answer, p. 5. A 
later summary judgment memorandum is more specific. There 
he claims plaintiff herein "waived his claim of 
constitutional injury" (T.R. p. 46; Defendant Murphy's 
Summary Judgment Memo, at 12) and waived a hearing on his 
objection to the offending order (id., at 5-6, 12 et seq.). 
Judge Murphy's claim of waiver does not apply in this case. 
Plaintiff was entitled to pre-deprivation due process, 
regardless of any available post-deprivation remedies. 
Plaintiff received no pre-deprivation hearing. A waiver of 
his constitutional rights cannot be inferred from 
plaintiff's actions. 
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1. Plaintiff was entitled to pre-deprivation due 
process. 
Pre-deprivation due process is necessary where it could 
decrease the risk of erroneous decisions without imposing an 
onerous burden on the state. Zinermon vs. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 
at 987; Mathews vs. Eldredae, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Post-
deprivation due process may be adequate specifically where 
pre-deprivation procedures are impractical, or where they 
would not add to the reliability of the decisions. 
Zinermon. at 984-985, citing, Parratt vs. Taylor, 451 U.S. 
527 (1981), overruled in part not relevant here, Daniels vs. 
Williams. 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
If pre-deprivation procedure was due, it is no answer 
that the state provided post-deprivation procedures. In 
Zinermon, the state provided post-deprivation procedures. 
In Zinermon, the state defendants sought to avoid § 1983 
liability by arguing that the plaintiff could pursue tort 
remedies as a result of his unlawful confinement in a mental 
institution. The Supreme Court declared! 
It is no answer that the State has a law which if 
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is 
supplementary to the State remedy, and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the 
federal one is invoked. 
Id., at 982, quoting Monroe vs. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-174 
(1961). 
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Here, Judge Murphy should have provided more due 
process before depriving plaintiff of his protected 
interests. Swearing in Mr. Randazzo, and giving plaintiff 
notice and a hearing before issuing the sanction order would 
not have imposed any significant burden. Yet, such measures 
would have greatly decreased the risk that plaintiff would 
be erroneously deprived. 
2. Plaintiff received no pre-deprivation due process. 
In this case, plaintiff did not receive nor did he 
waive a pre-deprivation hearing — he was never offered one. 
Judge Murphy claims that plaintiff waived his objection 
and a hearing thereupon.6 However, the decision of whether 
6
 Judge Murphy's argument about "waiving a hearing11 
misses the mark. There is no question that plaintiff 
indicated to Judge Murphy's clerk that oral argument was not 
necessary — that is, there was no need for the parties to 
physically appear before Judge Murphy and orally present 
arguments, etc. 
A "waiver" of oral argument, which occurred, is very 
different from a claim that plaintiff withdrew his objection 
or waived his right to contest the defective order of 
sanctions. When plaintiff waived an oral presentation, he 
had already submitted an objection, written arguments, an 
affidavit, etc. contesting the proposed order. Judge Murphy 
submits no evidence to suggest that plaintiff's waiver of 
oral argument was a waiver of the merits of plaintiff's 
objection 
With or without oral argument, the fact remains plain-
tiff presented valid claims that the order of sanctions was 
improper. Judge Murphy entered the sanctions overruling 
plaintiff's objections. 
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to grant a hearing was entirely within the discretion of 
Judge Murphy! Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration 
(1988) (before an extensively amended version became 
effective on January 15, 1990), read: 
(8) Decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless requested by the Court, 
in which even the Clerk shall schedule a date and 
time for such hearing. If a hearing is not 
requested by the Court, counsel shall notify the 
Clerk of the Court, in writing to submit the 
motion to the Court for decision . • . 
(9) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any issues therein 
on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting 
the motion may request a hearing and such request 
shall be granted unless the motion is summarily 
denied . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
In short, plaintiff filed the objection and request for 
a hearing, both of which Judge Murphy summarily denied when 
he signed the Order on October 12, 1989. Plaintiff was 
informed that he could have a hearing after Judge Murphy had 
already signed the offending Order, thus ending even a 
semblance of a pre-deprivation proceedings. (The hearing 
actually offered was for a non-existent motion to set aside 
the signed order.) 
This court need not determine how much pre-deprivation 
process was due plaintiff. The complaint demonstrates that 
plaintiff was entitled to some pre-deprivation protection, 
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and received none. Judge Murphy's claim of waiver cannot 
stand. 
3. Nothing in plaintiff's actions constitute a knowing 
waiver of his constitutional rights. 
Courts are reluctant to find that persons have waived 
constitutional rights absent proof not only that such waiver 
occurred, but also that the waiver was knowing and 
voluntary. Jones vs. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1981). 
A failure to follow statutorily or administratively 
defined post-deprivation procedures may preclude a plaintiff 
from challenging the defined post-deprivation procedures on 
due process grounds. In such cases, however, the party 
waived the right to challenge post-deprivation procedures by 
failing to utilize those post-deprivation procedures.7 By 
contrast, the plaintiff herein is challenging the adequacy 
of pre-deprivation process. He did not waive any statutory 
7
 Defendant Murphy cites Weinrauch vs. Park City, 751 
F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff essentially stole her 
car from the impound lot rather than seeking a post-
impoundment hearing, thereby forgoing her right to challenge 
the constitutional adequacy of that hearing); Riggins vs. 
Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707 
(8th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff chose means other than the 
established grievance procedure to appeal her discharge, 
thereby forgoing her right to challenge the constitutional 
adequacy of the post-discharge procedures); Jacobus vs. 
Heydiner, 643 F.Supp„ 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986) (plaintiff 
appealed his discharge to courts outside the statutorily and 
administratively defined grievance process, thereby forgoing 
his right to challenge the constitutional adequacy of that 
process). 
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or administrative pre-deprivation procedures• Further, 
plaintiff did not waive any post deprivation rights. At 
worst, plaintiff waived oral arguments, he did not withdraw 
or waive his objection. Even without oral arguments, Judge 
Murphy should have been able to see the major defects in his 
order of sanctions. 
Judge Murphy's signature on the Order in October 
rendered meaningless any comments the plaintiff made to the 
Judge's clerk in November. That plaintiff waived oral 
argument and said he would pursue the matter in a different 
forum was necessitated by the Judge having denied 
plaintiff's objection to the Order, and was not indicative 
of any waiver of his objections and claims flowing from 
constitutional injury. 
There is no question with regard to the lack of a pre-
deprivation hearing. The only thing plaintiff waived was 
oral argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The court below erred in dismissing plaintiff's action 
in that the complaint stated a cause o± action as a 
collateral attack against an order improperly entered. 
Plaintiff's cause of action was not barred by the doctrines 
of res judicata or judicial immunity, nor was plaintiff's 
claim waived by plaintiff. 
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RELIEF 
This court should determine and find that plaintiff's 
complaint stated a cause of action and was properly before 
the court below. 
Further, this Court should find and determine that: 
— defendant Judge Murphy was without subject matter 
and without personal jurisdiction to enter sanctions against 
Barnard in the Randazzo v. Randazzo case. 
~ defendant Judge Murphy lacked sufficient facts and 
evidence to impose sanctions in the Randazzo v. Randazzo 
case. 
~ defendant Judge Murphy failed to make the necessary 
factual findings to support a determination of contempt. 
-- defendant Judge Murphy failed to comply with the 
statutory provisions and pre-requisites before imposing 
sanctions in the Randazzo v. Randazzo case. 
— defendant Judge Murphy denied due process o£ law to 
plaintiff in imposing sanctions against plaintiff in the 
Randazzo v. Randazzo case. 
46 
This Court should reverse the decisions of the Trial 
Court and remand this matter with directions to grant to 
plaintiff the relief sought in his complaint. 
DATED this 31st day of AUGUST, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
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APPENDIX 
(AA) Complaint, May 31, 1990, T.R. p. 2. 
(BB) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal as against 
Defendant Judge Murphy, April 5, 1991, 
ToRe p. 345. 
(CC) Order of Dismissal as against 
Defendant Randazzo, April 28, 1992, T.R. 
p. 410. 
(DD) Notice of Appeal, May 6, 1992, T.R. p. 
413. 
(EE) Order of Dismissal by the Hon. Clarence 
Brimmer, United States District Court, May 
4, 1990. 
(FF) Letter to Defendant Murphy from plaintiff, 
dated October 4, 1989. 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone; (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
SRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
THE PLAINTIFF, BRIAN M. BARNARD, by and through his 
counsel of record, Brian M. Barnard of Utah Legal Clinic as 
a complaint and cause of action against the defendants, ANN 
L. WASSERMANN, SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY 
states and alleges as follows: 
civi l NO.&>^£>?0?#27<r2S 
C O M P L A I N T 
(Judge j ^ T o f t ? ) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
1. This is a civil action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to redress a deprLvati HI of property and liberty 
in violation of the constitution and laws of the United 
States. The plaintiff seeks no damages. The plaintiff 
seeks declaratory relief that an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court entered by the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY for the 
benefit of the other defendants is invalid, null and void, 
in part for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff 
further seeks injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement 
of said order. The plaintiff seeks attorney fees and court 
costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. 
JURISDICTION 
2. Jurisdiction is based on 42 U.S.C* § 1983. Juris-
diction is further based upon Ut. Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1953 
as amended) and Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Declaratory relief is authorized by Ut. Code Ann. and 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure• Injunctive relief is 
authorized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VENUE 
3. All of the conduct complained of occurred in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. All of the named individual parties to 
this action reside in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
PARTIES 
4. The plaintiff BRIAN M. BARNARD is an adult citizen 
and resident of Salt Lake County,, Utah. He is an attorney 
admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of Utah. 
5. The defendant ANN L. WASSERMANN is an adult citizen 
and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. She is an attorney 
admitted to practice before the Courts of the State of Utah. 
She is named as a party because this cause of action affects 
her rights. 
6. The defendant SHIRLEY RANDAZZO is an adult citizen 
and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. She is named as a 
party because this cause of action affects her rights. 
7. Frank Randazzo is an adult citizen and resident of 
Salt Lake County, Utah. He is not a defendant in this 
action. The plaintiff may seek (subject to courts1 ap-
proval) to amend his complaint at some future date to name 
his as a defendant. 
8. The defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY is an adult 
citizen and resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. He is a 
judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
FACTS 
9. The plaintiff formerly represented Frank Randazzo 
in a divorce action in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Case No. 88-4904130 
DA) captioned SHIRLEY RANDAZZO vs. FRANK RANDAZZO. 
10. That action was tried to the Court, the Hon. 
MICHAEL MURPHY, judge presiding on August 1, 1989. 
11. After the trial in said matter, and prior to 
September 13, 1989, plaintiff withdrew as counsel for Frank 
Randazzo for various reasons and gave notice of that with-
drawal to the Third District Court, to Frank Randazzo and to 
ANN WASSERMANN. 
12. On September 13, 1989 a hearing was held in said 
divorce action. The plaintiff was not present; present were 
all of the named defendants and Frank Randazzo, The hearing 
was to consider the alleged contempt of court by Frank 
Randazzo for failure to comply with the rulings of the 
Court• 
13. At said hearing, Frank Randazzo made certain 
representations to the Court regarding plaintiff's represen-
tation of Frank Randazzo. Those representations were not 
made under oath. Those representations were, at least in 
part, false, incomplete and/or mis-leading. 
14. At the hearing of September 13, 1989, the Court, 
the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY, judge presiding made an oral ruling 
to the effect that the plaintiff, Brian M. Barnard, had 
acted improperly in his representation of Frank Randazzo. 
The Court made an oral ruling to the effect that the Frank 
Randazzo should not pay to the plaintiff the sum of four 
hundred and thirty dollars, ($430.00), and a portion of fees 
owed to the plaintiff incurred in plaintiff's representation 
of Frank Randazzo. Instead, Frank Randazzo should pay that 
amount to SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and ANN L. WASSERMANN as and for 
attorney fees and costs incurred by SHIRLEY RANDAZZO. 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and ANNE WASSERMANN had requested that, at 
the hearing, attorney fees be assessed against Frank 
Randazzoe 
15. The plaintiff was not given notice that the 
hearing of September 13, 1989 would involve or consider any 
alleged mis-conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not 
given notice that said hearing would involve or consider the 
imposition of any sanction against the plaintiff. 
16. The plaintiff was not requested to be present at 
said hearing and was not given any opportunity to be heard 
at said hearing. 
17 • After said hearing and based upon the oral ruling 
of the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY, ANN L. WASSERMANN prepared a 
proposed order embodying the decision of the Court. A true 
and correct copy of that proposed order is attached hereto, 
marked Exhibit "0" and incorporated herein by reference. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN mailed a copy of said order to the plain-
tiff on or about September 15, 1989« 
18. Said oral ruling and the order (Exhibit "0") 
deprive the plaintiff of property in the sum of four hundred 
and thirty dollars ($430.00) owed by Frank Randazzo to the 
plaintiff. The Order provides that prior to paying any 
money owed by Frank Randazzo to the plaintiff, Frank 
Randazzo must pay four hundred and thirty dollars ($430.00) 
to ANN WASSERMANN for the benefit of SHIRLEY RANDAZZO. The 
Order provides that Frank Randazzo is to receive credit from 
the plaintiff as against funds owed to plaintiff by Frank 
Randazzo in the amount of four hundred and thirty dollars 
($430.00) for that which Frank Randazzo is required to pay 
to ANN WASSERMANN. 
19. Said oral ruling ami fhe order (Exhibit "O") harm 
the plaintiff's good name and reputation in that there are 
statements in said order in the nature of findings to the 
effect that the plaintiff failed or acted improperly in his 
representation of Frank Randazzo. 
20. In response to receipt of said proposed Order 
(Exhibit lfO") the plaintiff filed an Objection with th Court 
on or about September 18, 1989. A copy of that Objection is 
attached hereto marked Exhibit ,fB" and incorporated herein 
by reference. 
21. In response to receipt of said proposed order 
(Exhibit "0") the plaintiff filed an Affidavit with the 
Court on or about September 18, 1989. A copy of that 
Affidavit is attached hereto marked Exhibit ftA,f and incor-
porated herein by reference. 
22. On or about September 20, 1989 the plaintiff 
requested a hearing before the defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL 
MURPHY to consider plaintiff's Objection (Exhibit "B"). A 
copy of that request for hearing is marked Exhibit "R", 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, No 
hearing was held in response to that request. 
23. After the filing of said Objection (Exhibit "B") 
and said Affidavit (Exhibit "A") and without further hear-
ing, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY on or about October 12f 1989 
overruled the objection of the plaintiff hereinf and signed 
and entered the Order (Exhibit "O"). That order is a matter 
of public record. 
24. As a result of the signing and entry of said 
Order, the plaintiff has been deprived of property without 
due process. 
25• As a result uf the signing ami entry of said 
Order9 the plaintiff has been deprived of a liberty interest 
without due process, by harm done to his good name and 
reputation, 
26. The defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY and has 
used his power arid authority as a judge of the Third Judi-
cial District Court to deprive the plaintiff of property and 
liberty without due process. 
27. The defendant SHIRLEY RANDAZZO has benefited from 
the action of the defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set 
forth above to deprive the plaintiff of property and liberty 
without due process, in that her attorney will receive 
attorney fees taken from those nwrd by Frank Randazzo to the 
plaintiff, and thus reduce the fees owed by SHIRLEY RANDAZZO 
to ANN L. WASSERMANN. 
28. The defendant ANN L. WASSERMANN has benefited from 
the action of the defendant the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set 
forth above to deptive the plaintiff of property without due 
process, in that she will receive attorney fees taken from 
fees owed to the plaintiff by Frank Randazzo. 
29. The plaintiff is not a party to the divorce action 
between SHIRLEY RANDAZZO and Frank Randazzo. He is no 
longer attorney f<n Fiank Randazzo and w.is not counsel of 
record when the Order (Exhibit "0") was entered. The 
plaintiff has no power to appeal said Order through the Utah 
State Courts. The plaintiff lacks standing to appeal said 
Order through the Utah State Courts. 
30. The actions of the defendant were taken under 
color of state law, custom, policy or practice. The actions 
of the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY as set forth above were purport-
edly taken under the power granted to him as a Judge of the 
District Court of the State of Utah. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
31. The actions of the defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL 
MURPHY as set forth above constitute a violation of 42 
U.S0C. § 1983 and a deprivation of property and liberty 
without due process of law. 
32. Plaintiff was denied due process as guaranteed by 
the Utah Constitution. 
33. The actions of the defendant MURPHY as set forth 
above has caused harm to the plaintiff. 
34. The defendant, the Hon. MICHAEL MURPHY assessed 
attorney fees against the plaintiff without personal juris-
diction over the plaintiff to do so; he did so without 
receiving or hearing any sworn evidence, 
35. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief 
that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as it deprives the 
plaintiff of property without due process is null and void. 
36. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief 
that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as it deprives the 
plaintiff of a liberty interest (his good name and reputa-
tion) without due process is null and void. 
37. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and 
injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit "0") in so far as 
it deprives the plaintiff of property without due process is 
unenforceable. 
38• The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and 
injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit "0") was improper-
ly entered by the Court without personal jurisdiction over 
the plaintiff is thus unenforceable. 
39. The plaintiff is entitled to declaratory and 
injunctive relief that the Order (Exhibit f,0M) in so far as 
it deprives the plaintiff of a liberty interest (his good 
name and reputation) without due process in unenforceable. 
40* The plaintiff has incurred costs and attorney fees 
in this action and is entitled to re-imbursement under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988. 
RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands a judgment determing said 
order is null and void and enjoining the enforcement thereof 
plus attorney fees and costs and the relief set forth above. 
DATED this 31st day of MAY, 1990. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff^^, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of MAY, 1990 I 
caused to be mailed a copy of the above and foregoing 
COMPLAINT to: 
CRAIG PETERSON, Esq. 
426 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
WENDY FABER, Esq. 
Giauque, Williams, et al 
Keams Building # 500 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN, Esq. 
230 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ANN L. WASSERMANN - A3395 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone; (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—-ooOoo •-• —-
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
v
 c 
f-KANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
-ooOoo-
Case No. 884904130DA 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt came on for 
luMring on September 13, 1989, at the hour of 3:00 pem., the 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding. Plaintiff appeared in 
person and was represented by counsel, Ann L* Wassermann, Esq. 
initially, Defendant did not appear. The Court made telephonic 
contact with the Defendant, who subsequently appeared. He was 
not represented by counsel. The Court having considered the 
pleadings, the proffer of counsel for the Plaintiff, and the com-
ments of the Defendant and it appearing to the Court that the 
Defendant did not receive notice of the hearing, and it further 
appearing that Defendant's former counsel did not give Defendant 
- 1 - r PLAINT! e v u i f 
timely notice of the details of the Courtfs decision as announced 
on August 2, 1989, and it further appearing that Defendant's 
counsel did not forward to Defendant copies of the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce, and it further appearing 
that the Defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the 
Court's orders upon learning of them, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1* Plaintiff's Motion for Finding of Contempt is 
denied. 
2* Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce previously 
entered in this matter to provide that Defendant shall be 
:iquired to reimburse her for all monies expended by her as a 
it.ult ol Defendant1:; failure to comply with previous Court 
orders requiring him to make payments to the credit union. Those 
amounts shall be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff on or before 
December 13, 1989. 
3. Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of S4 30.00 
JS a:id for attorney§s fees incurred by Plaintiff in connection 
A'lth this contempt proceeding. The Defendant is ordered not to 
pay any money to his former counsel, Drian Barnard, until the 
award of attorney's fees is paid to counsel for the Plaintiff. 
Airthcr, any monies paid by Defendant to counsel for Plaintiff in 
:\:iijtaction of this obligation shall bo credited, dollar for 
-2-
dollar against Defendaat's outstanding balance with his prior 
counsel, Brian Barnard. 
DATED this ____. day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. MICHAEL R. MURPHX 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I horeby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order, this I) day of September, 
1969. to: 
Mr. Frank Randazzo 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Mr. Brian M. Barnard, Esq. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801) 328-9532 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO VACATE 
ORDER OP SANCTIONS 
and 
OBJECTION TO ORDER 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon, M. MURPHY) 
BRIAN M. BARNARD former counsel for the defendant in 
the above captioned matter objects and moves this Court as 
followst 
1. This Court ruled on September 13, 1989 that 
sanctions should be imposed upon former counsel for the 
defendant. 
2. Counsel for the plaintiff served upon former 
counsel for the defendant a copy of the proposed order based 
upon the hearing of September 13, 1989. 
3. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without 
notice to former counsel. 
4. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions without 
allowing former counsel to present evidence or explain his 
conduct. 
5. The Court ruled and imposed sanctions based on 
false or incomplete information. 
6. This objection and motion are supported by the 
Affidavit of Brian H. Barnard dated September 18, 1989 filed 
herewith. 
7. Former counsel for the defendant gave notice to 
defendant of the Court's ruling of August 2, 1989 in a 
cimaly and appropriate manner. Former counsel for the 
defendant gave notice to defendant of his obligations based 
upon the Court's ruling in a timely and appropriate manner. 
8. Entering an order of sanctions against former 
counsel, without notice and without an opportunity to be 
heard constitutes a deprivation of property and liberty 
without due process. 
WHEREFORE, Brian M. Barnard objects to the proposed 
order and imposition of sanctions against him and moves this 
Court to vacate the oral ruling and not enter the proposed 
order based upon that oral ruling. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing OBJECTION & MOTION TO VACATE tot 
ANN L. WASSERMANN Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Sale Lake City. Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 Vest 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB I 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A, RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phonei (801) 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BRIAN M, BARNARD 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SS. 
BRIAN M. BARNARD having been duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and states as followss 
1. I am the former counsel for the defendant in the 
above captioned matter. I am an attorney admitted to 
practice in this Court. 
r PLAINTIFF FYUIRIT 
2. During the afternoon of August 2, 1989, after the 
oral ruling by the Court in this' action, I had a telephone 
conversation with the defendant Frank Randazzo. In that 
conversation 1 read him my notes from the court's ruling. 
3. In that phone conversation, I specifically told him 
that he was obligated to bring current the indebtedness to 
the Cyprus Credit Union and that he had Co make the payment 
due in late August, 
4. On August 7, 1989, I received a letter from plain-
tiff's counsel (a copy is attached). On that date I mailed 
a copy of that letter to the defendant Frank Randazzo at 
6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123. Included with 
rh.it copy war. a note to call me. The defendant did not call 
me in rcponsc* to that note. 
5. On or about August 18, 1989, Z received proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce in this matter from plaintiff's counsel. On August 
19, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the defendant 
Frank Randazzo at 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, Utah 84123. 
Included with that copy was a note to review the documents 
and to call me. Defendant did not call me in response to 
that note. 
6. After the oral ruling and decision in this matter, 
I ordered a transcript of that ruling. I received that from 
this Court's stenographic reporter after August 18, 1989. 
on August Z3, 1989, shortly after receipt, I mailed a copy 
of that transcript: to the defendant at his Murray address. 
7. On or about September 1, 1989, I received an 
Affidavit of Plaintiff, a Motion for Contempt and a Notice 
of Hearing in this matter from plaintiff's counsel. On 
September 1, 1989 I mailed a copy of those pleadings to the 
defendant Frank Randazzo at his Murray address. Included 
with those copies was a note to review the documents and to 
call me. 
8. On or about September 5, 1989 I received a phone 
call from the defendant in which he acknowledged receipt of 
the Motion for Contempt and accompanying documents. He 
complained to me in that conversation about his wife's 
continuing refusal to deliver his property to him, her 
recently caking his horse to a pasture three hundred (300) 
miles away, etc. In that conversation I told him that my 
office could no longer represent him. 
9. In that September 5, 1989 conversation, I told him 
that he had to appear on September 13, 1989 for the hearing. 
10. On September 5, 1989 I prepared a withdrawal of 
counsel and mailed it to the defendant at 6458 South 1140 
West, Murray, Utah 84123. Included in that withdrawal is a 
notice of the hearing on September 13, 1989. 
11. Since May 2, 1989 the only home address that I 
have had for the defendant is 6458 South 1140 West, Murray, 
Utah 84123. 
12. Each of the documents as set forth above mailed to 
the defendant was sent to the defendant's Murray address 
with sufficient postage. None of the documents mailed as 
set forth above have been returned to me by the Postal 
Service. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRIAN H, BARNARD to-. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO 
Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
18th day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
1ITAU LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for Defendant 
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August 7* 1989 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. Brian M. Barnard* Esq. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 04111 
Ret Randazzo v. Randazzo 
Dear Briant 
I have obtained the following information from the 
Credit Union regarding the Randazzo loan; aa you will ace, it is 
necessary for Mr. Randazzo to act very quickly in this matter. 
First* with respect to the motorcycle insurance* the 
insurance is duo immediately, and the policy is subject to 
cancellation at any time. The insurance agent who has been 
handling the matter is Ray Horrocks* with Farmers Insurance. The 
premium duo ia $117.00* which will extend tho policy. I believe* 
for three months. Tho phono number for the Regional Office of 
Farmers Insurance is (208) 233-3571. 
I also obtained information regarding bringing the loan 
current* as well an with regard to making provision for future 
payments. As of August 7* 1989* a payment of $724.00 would bo 
required to bring the account current. Of that amount* $237*67 
represents accrued interest. Thus* payment in full of the amount 
would reduce tho principal owing by $486.00. You should note 
that another payment is due on the 28th of the month* which will 
be required in addition to payment of the $724.00. In terms of 
setting up a mechanism for future payments* it seems to mo that 
the simplest method would bo to credit Prank for a reduction in 
principal of $486.00 (this assumes payment of the $724*00 prior 
to August 28). If that amount is subtracted from $8*034.00 (tho 
amount Judge Murphy has allocated to Prank)* his portion of the 
outstanding principal would be $7,548*00* In turn* the total balance 
EXHIBIT 
Mr. Brian M. Barnard* Esq, 
August 7, 1989 
Page 2 
outstanding on the loan would be $3,646.00 ($9*132*00 minus 
$486.00). Frank*s proportion of that loan balance would be 87 
percent* I would suggest that he simply pay to Shirley 87 
percent of the monthly payment due ($362.00,) or $316.00 per 
month. Those payments would be made for the life of the loan. 
If my reasoning is not correct« please let me know at 
once. I would like to get the final divorce documents put 
together immediately, but want to make sure that we are clear on 
this matter. 
Very)truly yours( 
ALW/ams 
cat Shirley Randazzo 
359 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB § 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Former Attorney for FRANK A. RANDAZZO 
Defendant 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SHIRLEY N. RANDAZZO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK A. RANDAZZO, 
Defendant. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 88-4904130 DA 
(Hon. M. MURPHY) 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, former counsel for the defendant in 
the above captioned matter hereby requests this court to set 
for hearing the motion brought by Brian M. Barnard to vacate 
the order of sanctions entered against him and to set for 
hearing Brian M. Barnard's objection to the proposed order 
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989. 
DATED this 'jfetf-— day of September, 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
BRIAN v{. vtimxpr 
Attorney 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
•« _. ** 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
X hereby certify that X mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING tot 
ANN L. WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FRANK RANDAZZO 
Defendant Pro Se 
6458 South 1140 West 
Murray, Utah 84123 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service on the 
? / ^ day of SEPTEMBER, 1989. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMAN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. 900903227 CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The above-captioned matter having come before the Court 
on Friday, March 22, 1991 at the hour of 8:30 a.m. for 
consideration of plaintiff's and defendant, Judge Murphy's cross-
motions for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's motion for Judgment 
On The Pleadings. Plaintiff appeared pro se. Defendant Judge 
Murphy, was represented by Carlie Christensen. Defendant 
Randazzo, did not appear in person, nor through her counsel of 
record, Ann Wasserman, nor has the defendant Randazzo filed any 
response to plaintiff's motions. The Court having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
legal authorities submitted by the parties, and now being fully 
i&W&sii 
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advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983 challenging the constitutionality of a state court 
order issued by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy in the 
the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-4130, a divorce 
proceeding filed in the Thrid Judicial District Court, 
State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff, Brian Barnard is an attorney admitted to 
practice law in the State of Utah and formerly counsel 
for Frank Randazzo, the defendant in the divorce 
proceeding in Thrid District Court. 
3. Defendant, Ann Wasserman is also an attorney admitted to 
practice law in Utah and counsel for Shirley Randazzo, 
the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding in Third 
District Court. 
4. Defendant, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy is a duly 
appointed and elected judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court and presided over the Randazzo case. 
5. On September 13, 1989, at aproximately 3:00 p.m., Judge 
Murphy held a hearing on a Motion for a Finding of 
Contempt filed by Shirley Randazzo. Ms. Randazzo's 
BARNARD V WASSERMAN PAGE 3 MEMO DECISION 
motion sought to find Frank Randazzo in contempt for 
his failure to comply with the terms of the divorce 
decree and specifically, his failure to make payments 
to Ms. Randazzo's credit union to keep a loan obligation 
current. Ms. Randazzo and her counsel, Ann Wasserman 
were both present at the hearing. 
6. At 4:35 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the 
hearing began, Mr. Randazzo arrived without counsel. 
Judge Murphy noted for the record that Mr. Barnard had 
previously withdrawn as counsel from the case. 
7. After reviewing the pleadings on file, the proffer of 
Ms. Randazzo7s counsel and the representations of Mr. 
Randazzo, Judge Murphy found that Mr. Randazzo did not 
receive notice of the hearing; that his former counsel, 
Mr. Barnard did not give Mr. Randazzo timely notice of 
the details of the Court's decision as announced on 
August 2, 1989; and that Mr. Barnard did not forward 
copies of the proposed Findings of Fact and Divorce 
Decree to Mr. Randazzo. 
8. Based upon the foregoing, Judge Murphy concluded that 
Mr. Randazzo was not in contempt of court and ordered 
that the divorce decree be amended to require Mr. 
Randazzo to reimburse Ms. Randazzo for all monies 
expended by her as a result of Mr. Randazzo's failure 
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to keep the credit union loan current, and that Mr. 
Randazzo pay to Ms, Randazzo the sum of $430.00 for 
attorney,s fees incurred by her in connection with the 
contempt proceeding. Judge Murphy also ordered that 
Mr. Randazzo not pay any money to his former counsel 
until the award of attorneys7 fees was paid to Ms. 
Randazzo7s counsel and that money paid by Mr. Randazzo 
to Ms. Randazzo7s counsel be credited, dollar for 
dollar against Mr. Randazzo7s obligation to Mr. 
Barnard. 
On September 15, 1989, Ms. Randazzo7s counsel mailed a 
copy of the proposed order to Mr. Randazzo and Mr. 
Barnard. 
On or about September 18, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a 
"Motion to Vacate Order of Sanctions and Objection to 
Order" and his own affidavit in support of the motion. 
On September 20, 1989, Mr. Barnard filed a request for 
a hearing. 
On October 12, 1989, Judge Murphy signed the proposed 
order and directed his clerk, Marlene Bills, to hold 
the order pending resolution of Mr. Barnard7s 
objections. 
On November 14, 1989, Mr. Barnard appeared before Judge 
Murphy as counsel for defendants in the matter of Ward 
v. Butcher, Civil No. C88-4883, a matter unrelated to 
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the Randazzo case. At that time, Ms. Bills advised Mr. 
Barnard that Ms. Wasserman was not willing to stipulate 
to the entry of an amended order in the Randazzo matter 
and asked whether he wanted to schedule a hearing on 
his objections. Mr. Barnard advised Ms. Bills to file 
the order and that he would "take care of it another 
way". Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Ms. 
Bills issued a minute entry indicating that Mr. Barnard 
did not intend to have a hearing on his objections and 
that Judge Murphy's order of October 12, 1989 would be 
filed. 
13. Approximately one week later, on November 21, 1989, 
Judge Murphy held a scheduling conference in the matter 
of Ward v. Butcher. At that time, Judge Murphy 
inquired of Mr. Barnard whether Judge Murphy was named 
as a defendant in the matter of Barnard v. Wasserman 
and if so, whether Judge Murphy could continue to 
preside over the Ward case. Mr. Barnard indicated that 
unless there was a resolution to the Randazzo case, Mr. 
Barnard would be compelled to file a lawsuit. 
14. Judge Murphy then swore his clerk, Marlene Bills, 
and asked her to testify as to whether a hearing had 
been scheduled in the Randazzo matter. Ms. Bills 
testified as follows: 
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I told Mr. Barnard if Ann wasn't willing to amend 
the findings and Order, and if he wanted to 
schedule a hearing, that was fine. He indicated 
to me, "Go ahead and file then, because I'll just 
take care of it in Federal Court." After that, I 
filed the signed Findings of Fact and Order, and 
left it at that. I had been holding the papers 
for — well, since the 12th, when they were 
signed. And had been holding them and had not 
filed them until that day. 
Brian Barnard was then sworn and testified as follows: 
The conversation that your clerk related to you 
is correct, except for one particular, and that 
is I didn't make any reference to Federal Court 
at all. I said, "Go ahead and file it. I'll 
take care of it in another way." 
I also told her that I would take an S.O.B.. pill 
and go after Ann Wasserman, because I didn't like 
the way Ann Wasserman had treated me. And she 
commented in a joking manner, back to me. 
Based upon Mr. Barnard's representations, Judge Murphy 
disqualified himself from further proceedings in the 
Ward matter. 
On February 9, 1990, plaintiff filed suit against Judge 
Murphy in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah challenging the constitutionality of 
the state court order issued by Judge Murphy in the 
Randazzo case. 
On May 4, 1990, the Hon. Clarence Brimmer, the Chief 
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Wyoming, sitting by designation, ordered that 
plaintiff's claims be dismissed for lack of subject 
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matter jurisidiction. Judge Brimmer also found that 
the relief sought by plaintiff was barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity. 
19o On May 31, 1990, plaintiff filed this action in the 
Third District Court against the same parties and 
based upon the same legal theories as the federal 
action which he filed. On July 17, 1990, Judge Murphy 
accepted service of the summons and complaint. 
20. Defendant Shirley Randazzo has not filed any 
responsive pleadings to plaintiff's motions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. That this action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of a 
state court order issued by the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy in the case of Randazzo v. Randazzo, D-88-413 0, 
a divorce proceeding filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah. That the plaintiff in 
this action is seeking attorneys7 fees and costs 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988. 
2. That judges are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983 for acts committed within their judicial capacity. 
3. That a judge has acted in his judicial capacity if he 
has not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdicition 
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and if the act is a judicial one. Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 34, reh. den., 436 U.S. 951 (1978). 
4. That an act is a judicial act if it is a function 
normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt 
with the judge in his official capacity. Martinez v. 
Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985) 
5. That Judge Murphy's conduct consisted solely of 
conducting a hearing and signing and entering an order. 
That such conduct is consistent with the conduct 
normally engaged in by judges of the District Court. 
6. That the plaintiff's dealings with Judge Murphy were 
limited exclusively to actions performed by Judge 
Murphy in his judicial capacity. That plaintiff had 
no extra-judicial contact with Judge Murphy or dealt 
with the District Court in any other capacity than 
as an attorney. That the conduct in question 
consisted solely of normal judicial functions in a case 
pending before Judge Murphy and arose from dealings with 
the judge in his official capacity. 
7. That Judge Murphy's actions were judicial acts. Stump 
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 34, reh. den., 436 U.S. 951 
(1978); Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th 
Cir. 1985). 
8. That the test for determining the application of the 
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doctrine of judicial immunity is whether there is a 
clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject 
matter and not whether the judge committed procedural 
errors. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); 
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). 
That the District Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over contempt proceedings involving attorneys who 
willfully neglect or violate their duty. Utah Code 
Ann. Sections 78-3-4 and 78-32-1. 
That Judge Murphy had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the contempt proceedings against plaintiff for his 
alleged neglect in failing to inform his client of his 
responsibilities under the divorce decree. 
That any defects in the contempt procedures employed by 
Judge Murphy in the Randazzo case will not support a 
conclusion that there was a clear absence of all 
jurisdiction. Stump v Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) ; 
Rolleston v. Eldriqe. 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988); 
and Williams v. Sepe. 487 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1973). 
That Judge Murphy was acting in his judicial capacity 
at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, that all 
of his actions were judicial ones and that he did not 
act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. 
That judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective 
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injunctive relief against a judicial officer. Pulliam 
v, Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984). 
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief in the present case is simply an attempt to 
obtain the review and reversal of a state court order. 
Navajo Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 
F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah, 1985). 
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief is clearly retroactive and not prospective. 
Barnard v. Murphy, Civil No. 89-C-1042-B, Order on 
Motions for Summary Judgment (D. Utah, 1990). 
That plaintiff's request for injunctive and declaratory 
relief does not fall within the exceptional language 
contained in Pulliam. 
That plaintiff's claims are therefore barred by the 
doctrine of judicial immunity. 
That the fundamental requirement of due process of law 
is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 3 80 
U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
That the presumption against a claimed waiver of 
constitutional rights can be overcome upon a showing of 
a valid waiver. Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D. 
305, Salina, Kansas, 869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 
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1989) ; Johnnson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 734 
F.2d 774, 784 (11th Cir. 1984). 
That the determination as to whether a valid waiver 
exists depends upon whether there was an intentional 
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Edwards 
v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981). 
That a determination as to whether there was an 
intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known 
right, in turn, depends upon whether the party 
understood his rights, and whether he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived them. Ostlund v. Bob, 825 F.2d 
1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); Sassower v. Sheriff of 
Westchester Co.. 824 F.2d 184, 190 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
That plaintiff understood that he had the right to be 
heard inasmuch as he filed a written request for a 
hearing. 
That plaintiff voluntarily waived that right when he 
advised Judge Murphy's clerk to enter the order and 
informed her that he would "take care of it in another 
way". 
That plaintiff knowingly waived that right inasmuch as 
plaintiff is an attorney who practices extensively in 
the area of civil rights litigation, that he is 
WASSERMAN PAGE 12 MEMO DECISION 
informed about individual constitutional rights and the 
consequences of waiving those rights, and that he is 
retained by others to offer his professional judgment 
on the exercise and waiver of those rights. 
That plaintiff's direction to Judge Murphy*s clerk to 
enter the order and his statement that he would "take 
care of it in another way" were made with the 
understanding and knowledge that he would not recieve a 
hearing prior to the entry of the order. 
That once a state has provided a procedure for 
remedying a perceived wrong, a civil rights complainant 
is obligated to avail himself of those remedies, and if 
the complainant's due process rights are waived. 
Weinrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 
1984); Riqgins v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Nebraska, 790 F.2d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 1986); and 
Jacobus v. Heydiner, 643 F.Supp. 550 (S.D.W.Va. 1986). 
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard 
on his objections to the order and to remedy the 
perceived wrong, that plaintiff was obligated to avail 
himself of that remedy, and that plaintiffs decision 
not to utilize the procedure offered constitutes a 
waiver of plaintiffs due process rights. 
That where a state can feasibly provide a pre-
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deprivation hearing before taking a constitutionally 
protected property or liberty interest, it generally 
must do so regardless of the adequacy of the post-
deprivation remedy. Zinermon v. Burch, U.S. , 
110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). 
That plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally 
protected interest by the signing of Judge Murphy's 
October 12t 1989 order. 
That it was the entry of Judge Murphy's order which 
gave rise to the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's 
property and liberty interests. 
That until Judge Murphy entered the order, its contents 
were not a matter of public record nor was Shirley 
Randazzo, the plaintiff in the Third District Court 
divorce proceeding, able to enforce it. 
That plaintiff was not deprived of any property 
interest or liberty interest in his name and reputation 
until the order was entered. 
That plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be heard 
on his objections prior to the entry of Judge Murphy's 
order. 
That it was plaintiff's own direction to Judge Murphy's 
clerk to enter Judge Murphy's order, that resulted in 
its entry without further hearing. 
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35c That plaintiff did not suffer any deprivation of a 
constitutionally protected interest until Judge Murphy 
entered his order; that plaintiff had the opportunity, 
prior to the entry of that order, to be heard on his 
objections; that said opportunity constituted a pre-
deprivation remedy consistent with Zinermon and was 
constitutionally sufficient and that plaintiff waived 
that opportunity. 
ORDER 
1. Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment against 
defendant Shirley Randazzo is granted. The motion is 
unopposed. 
2o Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment against 
plaintiff is granted on the doctrines of Judicial 
Immunity, Res Judicata and Waiver. 
3. All other pending motions are denied as moot. 
£ Dated this O day of April, 1991. 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
BRIAN M. BARNARD USB #0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, j 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-90-0903227 C 
ORDER DISMISSING 
; COMPLAINT 
(Judge Pat Brian) 
THE ABOVE MATTER having come before the Court on March 
16, 1992, at 1:00 p.m., the Hon. Pat Brian, judge presiding, 
plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, 
defendant Randazzo appearing through her counsel of record, 
Ann Wassermann, defendant Murphy not appearing personally nor 
through his counsel, the Court having heard the arguments of 
the parties and having reviewed the file and the pleadings 
therein, upon the stipulation of the parties the court having 
considered the affirmative defense of the defendant Randazzo 
that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action 
upon which relief may be granted as against Randazzo, based 
thereon and upon the motion of defendant and for good cause 
appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The complaint as against defendant Shirley Randazzo, 
should be and hereby is dismissed. 
DATED this „ x^day of APRIL, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
A-' / 
PAT BRIAN, 
JUDGE 
Third District Court 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of APRIL, 1992 
Plaintiff caused to be mailed a copy of the above and 
foregoing pleading ORDER OF DISMISSAL to: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo 
426 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
COLIN WINCHESTER 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY 
230 South 5th East #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
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BRIAN M. BARNARD USB # 0215 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204 
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, : 
and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, : 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake : 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C-90-0903227 CV 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
(Judge Pat Brian) 
The plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby gives 
notice of his appeal to the Utah Supreme Court of the 
decision of this court (April 5, 1991) dismissing this 
action as against the defendant The Hon. Michael Murphy and 
the order (April 28, 1992) dismissing this action as against 
the defendant Shirley Randazzo. 
DATED this 6th day of MAY, 1992. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of MAY, 1992 
Plaintiff caused to be mailed a copy of the above and 
foregoing pleading NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
ANN WASSERMAN 
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo 
426 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
and 
COLIN WINCHESTER 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY 
230 South 5th East #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BRIAN M. BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANN L. WASSERMANN, 
SHIRLEY RANDAZZO, and 
THE HON. MICHAEL MURPHY, 
Judge of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
NO. 89-C-1042-B 
MAY - S 1990 ^ 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE COURTS 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter comes before the Court on the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings of the plaintiff and on the motions for summary 
judgment of defendants Ann L. Wasserman and Michael Murphy. The 
Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having heard the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now FINDS and 
ORDERS as follows: 
Background 
Plaintiff Brian M. Barnard is an attorney who represented 
Frank Randazzo in a divorce action tried before the defendant, 
Michael Murphy, Judge of the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County. The defendant, Ann Wassermann, is an attorney who 
represented Shirley Randazzo in the divorce action. Shirley 
Randazzo is also named as a defendant in this action, and the Court 
has entered default against her for her failure to answer the 
complaint. 
Frank Randazzo was required to make certain payments to 
Shirley Randazzo pursuant to the divorce decree. Those payments 
were not made, and Shirley Randazzo moved to hold Frank Randazzo 
in contempt. Neither Frank Randazzo nor Barnard appeared at the 
time set for the hearing on the motion September 13, 1989. The 
court noted that Barnard had withdrawn as counsel for Frank 
Randazzo September 6, 1989, giving notice of that withdrawal to 
Randazzo, to the Court, and to Wasserman. Randazzo appeared at the 
hearing pro se an hour and thirty-five minutes late. Upon hearing 
his side of the story, Judge Murphy ordered Randazzo to pay any 
attorney fees due Barnard to Wasserman.1 
* The court ordered Wasserman to draw up an order reflecting its 
THE COURT: Let me tell you what you are going 
to do. Before you pay Mr. Barnard one dime 
more, you will pay to Ms. Wasserman for her 
fees in regard to this hearing $43 0, which will 
be, in my mind, — listen to me, Mr. Randazzo -
- a direct credit for the amounts that you owe 
Mr. Barnard. 
Randazzo v. Randazzo, No. 88-4904130DA, Sept. 13, 1989 transcript 
at 29. 
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decision, which Wasserman did. She mailed a copy of the Order to 
Barnard, and he filed his motion to vacate the sanctions and 
objections to the order, along with an affidavit and a request for 
a hearing, on September 20, 1989. On November 21, 1989, at a 
hearing in an unrelated matter in which Barnard represented one of 
the parties, Judge Murphy inquired of Barnard whether he intended 
to file suit against him, "because if I'm a party to a lawsuit like 
that I donft see how I can sit on this case..." Ward v. Butcher, 
No. C 88-4483, Nov. 21, 1989, transcript at 2. Judge Murphy's 
clerk was sworn and testified that she had called Barnard to ask 
whether he wanted her to schedule a hearing on his objections. He 
indicated to her that he did not, so she filed the Order imposing 
sanctions, which she had been holding at Judge Murphy's direction. 
Id. at 8. Barnard was then sworn and testified that he had told 
the clerk to "go ahead and file" the Order, because he intended to 
either file a Writ of Mandamus in state court or file an action in 
federal court. Id. at 9. 
The Order imposing sanctions upon Barnard was filed in the 
Third Judicial District Court November 14, 1989. On November 22, 
1989, Barnard filed the complaint in this action, alleging that 
defendants had deprived him of his constitutional rights and 
3 
seeking damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The 
complaint alleges that Judge Murphy, acting under color of state 
law, deprived Barnard of his property and liberty interests without 
due process of law, and that Wasserman acted in concert with him. 
Barnard seeks judgment declaring the Order to be null and void and 
unenforceable. He further seeks damages from Wasserman, and 
attorney fees and costs against all defendants. 
Barnard now moves for judgment on the pleadings, and both 
Murphy and Wasserman have moved for summary judgment. 
Jurisdiction 
This Court must first address the threshold question whether 
it has jurisdiction in this case. The Tenth Circuit has held that 
review of state court judgments in judicial proceedings may only 
be had in the United States Supreme Court. Van Sickle v. Holloway, 
791 F.2d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1986). "Federal district courts do 
not have jurisdiction 'over challenges to state-court decisions in 
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those 
challenges allege that the state court's action was 
unconstitutional."' Id. (quoting District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983)). 
4 
Defendants argue that Barnard's § 1983 action is in fact a 
challenge to a state court proceeding, and that this Court is 
therefore without jurisdiction to hear it. They point to the fact 
that part of the remedy sought by the plaintiff is declaratory or 
injunctive relief voiding the Order entered in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Utah. 
Barnard contends this action is not an attempt to obtain 
review of a state court decision in federal court. He argues that 
he is only challenging the procedure by which the court deprived 
him of his constitutional rights; he does not seek review of the 
merits of that decision. Therefore, Barnard reasons, this case 
does not fall under the prohibition of Van Sickle and Feldman. 
Barnard relies on Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429 
(10th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985), to support 
his argument. In that case, the Tenth Circuit had before it a § 
1983 action in which an attorney sought judgment declaring that 
the Colorado procedure for disciplining attorneys violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 143 0. The 
court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear that case because 
it did not involve an attorney's challenge to particular discipline 
imposed upon him, but a "generalized constitutional attack on the 
5 
state's rules and regulations governing discipline." Id. at 1432. 
The court relied on Feldman to make the distinction, holding that 
"in the latter kind of case, the district court is not required to 
review a state court judicial decision but rather to assess the 
validity of a rule promulgated in a non-judicial proceeding." Id. 
Barnard's interpretation of the Razatos holding does not 
withstand scrutiny. The court in that case distinguished between 
rule-making and judicial proceedings. The law simply will not fit 
Barnard's attempt to distinguish between the merits and procedure 
within a judicial proceeding. The holdings of both Razatos and Van 
Sickle are clear: a federal district court is without jurisdiction 
to review a state court judicial decision. The Order which is the 
source of Barnard's complaint is just such a judicial decision, and 
this Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to hear this case. 
Judicial Immunity 
Although we need proceed no further, the Court will 
nevertheless address the issue of judicial immunity. The value to 
the courts of being free from harassment by dissatisfied litigants 
far outweighs the danger that some wrongs may go unredressed. 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). For that reason, "a judge 
6 
is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in clear 
absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial one." 
Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Barnard does not argue that Judge Murphy was not acting in his 
judicial capacity. Instead, he cites Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 
522 (1984) , for the proposition that judicial immunity is not a bar 
to an action for injunctive relief. Barnard again misinterprets 
the law. In Pulliam, the plaintiff sought to enjoin a state 
Magistrate from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense. The 
United States District Court for the District of Utah has already 
rejected the application of Pulliam to an action for an injunction 
which sought retroactive, rather than prospective, relief. Navajo 
Nation v. District Court for Utah County, 624 F.Supp. 130, 137 
(D.Utah 1985). The relief sought by Barnard is clearly retroactive 
and not prospective, and is therefore barred by judicial immunity. 
Wasserman asserts, incorrectly, that the immunity of her co-
defendant extends to the action against her. The Tenth Circuit has 
held that "the immunity of a state official will not necessarily 
protect a private individual alleged to have conspired with him." 
Shaffer v. Cook, 634 F.2d 1259, 1260 (10th Cir. 1980). However, 
7 
Barnard has alleged no facts sufficient to establish the existence 
of a conspiracy between Wasserman and Murphy. n[L]awyers do not 
act under color of state law solely by engaging in private 
litigation on behalf of their clients." Id. at 1261 (quoting Brown 
v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)). In order to go 
forward in the action against her, Barnard must show that Wasserman 
reached an understanding with Murphy to deprive Barnard of his 
constitutional rights, or that she was a willful participant in a 
joint activity with Murphy. Adickes v. Kress S Co., 398 U.S. 144, 
152 (1970) . All Wasserman is alleged to have done is draft a 
document embodying the Order of the court. As the Tenth Circuit 
found in Shaffer, fl[n]othing in the complaint indicates that the 
court or the attorneys were acting outside the confines of the 
neutral function of a judicial forum." 634 F.2d at 1260. Barnard 
therefore has no cause of action against Wasserman. 
THEREFORE, it is 
ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. It is further 
ORDERED that defendants' motion for sanctions be, and the same 
hereby is, DENIED. 
Dated this Af day of May ,..1990 
CHIEF JUDGE, 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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BRIAN BARNARD, 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE 
V. 
ANN WASSERMANN, ET AL., 
Defendants. CASE NUMBER: 89-C-1042.B 
£ ] Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered 
its verdict. 
Q Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a 
decision has been rendered. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs complaint is dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants' motion for 
sanctions is denied. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff. 
May 8, 1990 
Date 
(By) Deputy Clerk 
f»r*r 
2t 4 East Fifth South 
SaltLake Gty,Vath 841U 
(801) $28-9531-S2SW32 
Attotntj 
Brian M. Barnard October 4, 1989 r> 
The Hon. Michael R. Murphy, Judge 
Third District Court 
2A0 East A00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Randazzo vs. Randazzo 
"Civil Mo. 88-4904130 "DA 
N O V M 1989 „ 
ruS&Scc> 
°"PVtyC*r* 
Dear Judge Murphy: 
As you know I have made a motion to vacate the 
sanctions and objected to the proposed order in this matter 
based on the hearing of September 13, 1989. 
Mr. Randazzo recently filed a bankruptcy (Case No. 
89-05650-B). 
Not withstanding that bankruptcy$ I am concerned about 
the contents of the proposed order based on the hearing of 
September 13, 1989. As you are aware9 the Findings in that 
order were to the effect that I somehow was negligent in my 
duties and responsibilities as his legal counsel. I don't 
want those findings to remain unchallenged. As you are 
aware 1 filed an affidavit in this matter dated September 
18, 1989 setting forth my various contact with Mr. Randazzo 
and that I timely conveyed to him information with regard to 
court's rulings. 
If that proposed order has not been entered and will 
not be entered that resolves my concerns. If that order has 
been entered, I feel compelled to take some action to 
correct those Findings. 
Would you please advise me as to whether that proposed 
order has been entered or will be entered. 
Thank you. 
BMB/asw 
cc: Frank Randazzo 
Donn Cassity, Esq. 
Ann Wassermann, Esq. 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of AUGUST, 1992 
Plaintiff caused to be mailed four (4) copies of the above 
and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
ANN WASSERMANN 
Attorney for Defendant Randazzo 
426 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
and 
COLIN WINCHESTER 
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT MURPHY 
230 South 5th East #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
counsel for opposing parties, postage prepaid in the United 
States Postal Service. 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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